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WHAT'S MINE IS YOURS:
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER COLLECTIVE CORPORATE
KNOWLEDGE IN SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
Justin Jennewine *
"If crimes are committed, they are committed by people, they are not
committed by some free-floating entity. These companies and other
entities don't operate on automatic pilot. There are individuals that
make decisions - and some make the right decisions, and some make the
wrong decisions." Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Great Depression was perhaps the most economically crippling
event in American history.2  President Franklin Roosevelt swiftly
attributed the initial stages of the depression to the proliferation of big
business throughout the country at that time. 3  President Roosevelt's
solution to this crisis was the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA),
which came as part of the New Deal legislation.4
In 1934, Congress passed the SEA, instituted to protect investors
from stock price manipulation. 5 By enacting the SEA, Congress also
created the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) to
oversee the SEA's enforcement and maintain its effectiveness. 6
Through Section 10b, the SEA made it unlawful to manipulate or
deceive investors through any means that would contradict the rules and
regulations of the Commission. 7 Acting under their statutory authority,
the Commission promulgated Rule lOb-5, which specifies that it is
unlawful for anyone to make false or untrue statements or to omit
material facts that are necessary to prevent misleading statements.8
* Associate Member, 2014-2015; Articles Editor, 2015-2016, University of Cincinnati Law
Review.
1. Nathaniel Popper, Judge Jed Rakoff taps into nation's outrage over economic crisis, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/10/business/la-fi-rakofflO-2010apr10.
2. John Hardman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, EDGE,
https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/povertyjprejudice/soc-sec/hgreat.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
3. See John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing
Game, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 618 (2008) (citing Michael J. Kaufman, The PSLRA, Enron andLaxity,
in SECURITIES LITIGATION DAMAGES § 4:4 (2007)).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
5. Id. § 78b.
6. Id. § 78d(a).
7. Id. § 78j.
8. 12 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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The question then becomes: despite the fact that a corporation is
deemed a legal person, how can it commit fraud when the corporation is
not a living entity? The answer being that when an officer acts on the
corporation's behalf, the actions knowledge, and scienter of the officer
are imputed to the corporation. However, courts have not agreed on
how corporate scienter should be applied. The first issue courts face
when deciding this issue is determining which employees are significant
enough to have their knowledge imputed on the corporation and whether
the individual's knowledge can be considered collectively or if each
individual's knowledge needs to be considered independently. The
second issue courts face is whether it is possible for a plaintiff to
successfully plead scienter against a corporate defendant without
successfully pleading that any individual acted with scienter.
Originally, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits agreed that a plaintiff can
successfully plead that a corporate defendant acted with scienter only if
the officer of the corporation making the fraudulent or misleading
statement also acted with scienter. 1° Conversely, the Sixth Circuit, and
the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, to a lesser degree, have said
that the knowledge of any employee can be considered collectively and
that a strong inference of scienter can be raised with regard to a
corporate defendant without finding that an employee of the corporation
acted with scienter. 11 With those two positions fundamentally at odds
with each other, the Sixth Circuit recently clarified its original position
in an attempt to find a middle ground between the two extremes.
This Casenote will determine which circuit has adopted the correct
approach for determining corporate scienter and, using this correct
approach, answer the question of whether a corporation can act with
scienter without sufficient proof that any employee of the corporation
acted with scienter. Part II of this Casenote explores the body of law
surrounding this issue, including the SEA and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, by analyzing the history purpose,
adaptation, interpretation and enforcement of the legislation. Part III
explores the existing case law regarding collective scienter as well as the
new "middle ground" proposed by the Sixth Circuit. 14 Part IV analyzes
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (AM. LAW. INSTIT. 2006).
10. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004); Phillips v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
11. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005);
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008);
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008); Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v.
Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008).
12. In re Omnicare, Inc. Secs. Litig., 769 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2014).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
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why the "middle ground" rule is the most appropriate way to attach
corporate scienter and explains why the Sixth Circuit's ruling should be
read to prohibit a plaintiff from pleading corporate scienter without
successfully pleading individual scienter. Finally, Part V provides a
summarization of the existing state of the law, explores the implications
of the middle ground on securities law in the future, suggests that future
courts adopt the Sixth Circuit's newly created "middle ground" rule for
attaching corporate scienter, and recommends that future courts reject
the collective scienter theory. 16
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Congress enacted the SEA to regulate the secondary trading of
securities through exchanges and over-the-counter markets." While the
stated purpose of the SEA was to "perfect the mechanism of a national
market system for securities," courts have found that the underlying
motivation was to protect investors from stock price manipulation.
Section 10b of the SEA makes it "unlawful for any person ... to use or
employ ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulation as the Commission may
prescribe.., for the protection of investors."'1 9 Additionally, the SEA
created the Securities and Exchange Commission as the overseeing body
of the SEA. The Commission is responsible for promulgating
legislation to further the purpose of the SEA.2 1 Acting pursuant to that
power, the Commission enacted Rule 1Ob-5, which states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by use of any means or instrumentality of intrastate
commerce . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading. 22
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010).
18. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010).
20. Id. § 78d. The Commission is comprised of five commissioners appointed by the President
of the United States and approved by the Senate. Id. § 78d(a).
21. See id. § 78j.
22. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1951).
2016]
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The majority of private securities fraud claims are brought under
Section 10b and Rule 1Ob-5, notwithstanding the fact that neither
provision explicitly provides for a private cause of action.2 3 However,
federal courts have long recognized the right of private litigants to seek
relief under Rule 1Ob-5.
To succeed on a claim under Rule lOb-5, the plaintiff must prove
that: (1) the defendant(s) made a material misrepresentation or omission;
(2) the defendant(s) possessed scienter; (3) the material
misrepresentation or omission was connected to the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) the plaintiff(s) relied on the defendant's material
misrepresentation or omission; (5) the plaintiff(s) suffered an economic
loss; and (6) the economic loss was caused by the plaintiff's reliance on
the defendant's material misrepresentation or omission.25 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the language of the SEA on more than one
occasion. Such was the case in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, where a
prominent dispute arose over the term "scienter." 26 The Court defined"scienter" as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud" and held that it was a prerequisite to any claim brought under
Section 10b or Rule 10b-5. 27 Both intentional and reckless conduct are
adequate to meet the scienter requirement.
28
B. Securities Litigation Reform
To raise a standard civil complaint under the rules of federal
procedure, a complaint only needs to plead a "short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and a demand
for the relief sought. 29  However, all complaints alleging fraud,
including securities fraud cases, must "state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud." 30  The person's mental state could
still be alleged generally.
3
For fifty years, the SEA protected investors from stock price
manipulation. The SEA and the regulations promulgated by the
23. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1975).
24. See Wunderlich, supra note 3, at 619 n.42.
25. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (citing the elements of a Rule
10b-5 claim).
26. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
27. Id. at 193 n.12.
28. See Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 667, 673 (1991).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8(a) also requires the pleader to make a short and plain statement
showing that the court of filing has jurisdiction. Id.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
31. Id.
[VOL. 84
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Commission contributed to the creation of the finest financial
32marketplace in the world. However, as the marketplace developed and
securities fraud litigation became more common, Congress saw a need
to protect corporations from fraudulent claims and unnecessary litigation
by enacting a heightened pleading standard for plaintiffs.
The 1990s brought an influx of perceived SEA abuses, including
frivolous investor lawsuits.33  In these so-called "strike suits," large
classes of investors would claim that a corporation violated Rule lOb-5
without any particular facts supporting the allegation. 34 Congress found
that these lawsuits "unnecessarily increase the cost of raising capital and
chill corporate disclosure" and were frequently litigated by the same
"professional plaintiffs. 35  Congress proposed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) as a solution to this problem.36
Through the PSLRA, Congress sought to accomplish three goals: (1) to
encourage corporate issuers to voluntarily disclose information; (2) to
remove power from lawyers and return power to individuals in private
security litigation; and (3) to encourage defendants to fight abusive
claims while also allowing plaintiffs to continue to pursue valid
claims.37  In pursuit of these goals, the PSLRA instituted a heightened
pleading which has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to plead a Rule
1 Ob-5 violation.38
The heightened pleading standard for fraud cases contains a scienter
element requiring that "the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate [the act], state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.",39 Requiring that complaints plead particular facts giving rise
32. See Wunderlich, supra note 3, at 620 (citing Kaufman, supra note 3).
33. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
34. See Wunderlich, supra note 3, at 620 n.50. These investor lawsuits and strike suits
essentially boiled down to frivolous claims against companies based on the company's announcement of
bad news. Once the complaint was filed, the plaintiff could use discovery to either find something that
the company was doing wrong that it had no knowledge of prior to filing the lawsuit or the plaintiff
could use the inconvenience and cost of discovery to leverage a settlement from the company. Even
meritless claims can damage a company's reputation and can be such a financial burden that a
settlement becomes the most practical way for the company to resolve the situation.
35. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
36. President Bill Clinton originally vetoed the bill but the veto was overridden by Congress.
See Wunderlich, supra note 3, at 621 n.52-53 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S19035 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995);
141 Cong. Rec. S19180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995)).
37. S. REP. No. 104-98 at 4 (1995).
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
39. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). Scienter is "[a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally
responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act's having been done
knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil or criminal damages." Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons:
Collective Scienter in SEC Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 2 n.2 (2009) (citing BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009)).
2016]
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to a strong inference of the defendant's mental state is a stricter standard
than Federal Civil Procedure Rule 9(b), which only requires that the
mental state be pleaded generally.4 0  If a plaintiff does not meet the
requirements of the PSLRA, the defendant can file a motion to dismiss
the claim and the reviewing court must then dismiss the complaint.
4 1
Because the Supreme Court has heard only a handful of cases
interpreting the PSLRA, the lower courts have been assigned the task of
determining what it means for a defendant to satisfy the scienter
requirement.
C. Interpretation of the PSLRA
Courts have grappled with the scienter requirement of the PSLRA
since its inception and the lack of legislative guidance has led to several
splits in the law.4 2 The first dispute between circuits concerned the
congressional intent behind the PSLRA's use of the phrase "strong
inference" when the court considers a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).43 In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme
Court found that in order to qualify as a "strong inference," an inference
of scienter "must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must
be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of non-
fraudulent intent."44 As a general rule, if the argument for the existence
of fraud is at least as compelling as the argument that there was no
fraud, then the complainant has adequately pleaded scienter. 45  The
Supreme Court decision in Tellabs has spurred criticism about its
workability, predictability, and constitutionality.
46
40. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A), with FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3).
42. See Wunderlich, supra note 3, at 623-26
43. Id. at 623. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a civil procedure motion in which one party
asks the court to dismiss the complaint filed against him or her because the complaint fails to state a
claim for which relief can be granted. Typically, this means that the complainant failed to plead one or
more element of the action. Because pleading standards tend to be quite liberal, motions to dismiss are
usually unsuccessful. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
44. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
45. See generally id.
46. See generally Wunderlich, supra note 3. While an understanding of the pleading
requirement is fundamental in understanding the current securities fraud jurisprudence, this case is
worth mentioning simply because it is an apt demonstration of the confusion that has surrounded the
implementation of the PSLRA. There is even strife within the opinion in Tellabs. Justice Scalia and
Alito, both writing concurrences, argue that the phrase "strong inference" calls for something stricter
than what the Court offers. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 333 (Alito, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens, however, believes the standard of the Court is too strict and will do
nothing more than keep valid claims out of court. Id. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 84
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D. Corporations and Securities Fraud Litigation
The second, and most recent, PSLRA split has centered on the
concept of scienter as it relates to corporate defendants. Corporations
are legal fictions-they cannot think or act on their own.4 7  A
corporation acts solely through its agents but it has a legal status totally
distinct from its shareholders and agents. 8 Because corporations cannot
make decisions on their own accord, courts and legislatures determine
when the actions of an agent can be imputed onto the corporation.
Courts are widely in agreement that a corporate defendant has acted
with the requisite scienter when a corporate official makes a public
statement including a misstatement, and that official acted with
scienter. 4 5 However, there are situations where the equitable result is
less clear.50 For example, courts struggle to determine how much
liability the corporate defendant should bear when a lower level
employee was responsible for the misstatement, or when the employee
who made the public statement was not the employee who possessed
scienter. Courts have historically assigned scienter to the corporate
defendant based on two theories: (1) respondeat superior and (2)
collective scienter.
Respondeat superior holds that an employer is liable for the actions of
his employee when the employee is operating within the scope of his
employment. 51  When used in the context of corporate scienter, the
theory of respondeat superior, sometimes referred to as "weak-form"
corporate scienter, holds that a "corporation is deemed to have the
requisite scienter for fraud only if an individual corporate officer making
a statement has the requisite level of scienter at the time he or she makes
the statement. ' 52 Respondeat superior "is the most accepted method of
imputing liability to a corporation" because the corporation is in a betterfinancial position than the employee to compensate the plaintiff.53
47. See Bondi, supra note 39, at 2.
48. Id. at 2-3
49. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004).
50. See Heather F. Crow, Comment, Riding the Fence on Collective Scienter: Allowing Plaintiff
to Clear the PSLRA Hurdle, 71 LA. L. REv. 313, 314-16 (2010). The first scenario contemplates a CEO
making a statement that is proven to be false, but the CEO has no knowledge of its falsehood because a
lower level employee did not tell the CEO. The second scenario contemplates the CEO making the
same false statement with no knowledge of its falsehood, but the CFO is made aware of the falsehood
and tells the lower level employees not to disclose the information. The final scenario contemplates the
CEO who knows a product is dangerous, makes no statement about the product, and sits by while the
public relations department makes statements that the CEO knows are false.
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (2006).
52. In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 F. App'x 296, 303 (9th Cir. 2005).
53. Patricia S. Abril, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 81, 112
(2006). See also Lewis A Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice between Enterprise and
2016]
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However, critics of respondeat superior claim that it is most effective in
simple cases that do not include multiple actors, and that the theory fails
in many securities fraud cases where the speaker is not the person with
scienter. 54 For situations where respondeat superior is not appropriate,
courts may look to the doctrine of collective scienter.
Collective scienter, also known as collective knowledge, works by
aggregating the knowledge of a company's employees or agents in order
to determine the knowledge of the company. Contrary to respondeat
superior, the strong form of collective scienter does not require the
plaintiff to show that the corporate officer responsible for making the
statement had the requisite scienter but, simply, that the aggregate of the
corporation's employees had "collective knowledge and intent." 56
Whichever method a court applies to a given set of facts can
drastically change the outcome of a case. One of the most pressing
issues courts now face occurs at the pleading stage in a private securities
fraud case. The question of debate is whether or not a corporate
defendant can have scienter according to Rule 1Ob-5 if the plaintiff fails
to sufficiently plead that any of the individual defendants had scienter.
The circuits are currently debating this issue, and there has recently been
movement from the Sixth Circuit regarding the appropriate standard.
The next section will review the existing case law regarding this topic,
including the opinions of each circuit court and the recent proposal by
the Sixth Circuit.
III. AN OVERVIEW
Six of the thirteen federal circuit courts have weighed in on the issue
of whether a corporate defendant can be found to have the requisite
scienter when none of the individual defendants are found to possess
scienter. 57 The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have stated that in
the pleading stage of a trial, a corporate defendant can possess scienter
without an individual defendant possessing it-strong-form collective
scienter. 58 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have found that there is no
support for such a finding, and that. only an identified officer making the
statement who possesses the requisite scienter can have their scienter
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345, 1362-63 (1982) (discussing the fact that
employees are usually not financially able to compensate a victim).
54. See Abril, supra note 53, at 116.
55. See id. at 86.
56. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
57. See generally supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
58. See Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d
Cir. 2008); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008); Glazer Capital
Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008).
[VOL. 84
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imputed on the corporation-respondeat superior.59  In an earlier
decision, the Sixth Circuit fully embraced strong-form collective
corporate scienter. 60 However, the Sixth Circuit's most recent decision
on the issue seeks a middle ground.6'
A. Circuits in Favor of Strong-Form Collective Scienter
In Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital,
Inc., the Second Circuit heard a case involving Merit Securities Corp., a
subsidiary of the defendant corporation, Dynex Capital.62 Merit made
loans to investors interested in manufactured homes and then pooled
those loan obligations into asset-backed securities. 63 After the bonds
were issued, default rates increased rapidly, and each new default was
more financially costly to Merit than the last.64  Moody's Investor
Service 65 investigated the bonds after Dynex disclosed that it had
understated the repossession rates on Series 13 Bonds by nearly thirty-
four percent in October 2003. 6 6 In April 2004, Merit disclosed that it
had identified an internal control deficiency related to the recording of
loan losses. The announcement caused the Series 12 Bond and Series
13 Bond prices to decrease by as much as eighty-five percent. 67
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund ("Teamsters"),
which had purchased approximately $450,000 worth of Series 13 Bonds,
filed suit under the SEA against Dynex and Merit, as well as both
68companies' Chief Executive Officers. Teamsters claimed that Dynex
told dealers that they would purchase very risky loans in an attempt to
increase market share in the home financing market but that Dynex
never disclosed this fact to consumers in the offering materials at the
time of sale.69  The defendants moved to dismiss, claiming thatTeamsters failed to adequately plead scienter, and the district court
59. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004);
Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2004).
60. See City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005).
61. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Secs. Litig., 769 F.3d 455 (6th Cit. 2014).
62. Teamsters Local 445, 531 F.3d 190.
63. Id. at 192. Henceforth known as the "Series 12 Bonds" and "Series 13 Bonds."
64. Id. at 192-93.
65. "Moody's Investors Service is a leading provider of credit ratings, research, and risk
analysis. Moody's commitment and expertise contributes to transparent and integrated financial
markets, protecting the integrity of credit." Moody's Inv. Servs.,
https://www.moodys.com/Pages/atc002.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
66. Teamsters Local 445, 531 F.3d at 193. Moody reclassified the bonds from "high quality" to
"speculative" in February of 2004. Id.
67. Id. 193.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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granted the motion with respect to the individual defendants. 70
However, the district court found that Dynex had originated defective
loans of borrowers that they should have known were not creditworthy,
which is sufficient to establish the inference that officers and employees
of the corporate defendant had the motive and intent to commit fraud.71
On appeal, the Second Circuit overturned the district court's ruling
and found that Teamsters had failed to adequately plead scienter on the
part of the corporate defendants. 72 However, the Court concluded that,
as a matter of law, it is possible to plead "corporate scienter ... in the
absence of successfully pleading scienter as to an expressly named
officer." 73
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit are both in agreement with the Second
Circuit's holding. The Seventh Circuit found that the while strong-form
collective scienter was inconsistent with the strong inference
requirement of the PSLRA, it is still possible to draw a "strong inference
of corporate scienter without being able to name the individuals who
concocted and disseminated the fraud.",74 The Ninth Circuit added that,
regardless of the court's opinion of the Seventh Circuit's holding, the
court could foresee a situation where some public statement was so
dramatically false that it would create a strong inference of corporate
scienter.75
B. Circuits in Favor of Respondeat Superior
In Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., the Fifth
Circuit decided a case where the defendant, INSpire, provided
administrative services in the property and casualty insurance industry. 76
Other named defendants included the parent company of INSpire and
INSpire's CEO, CIO, CFO, and Treasurer.7 7 The plaintiffs brought suit
claiming that the defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to deceive
investors about the company's performance with the intention of
inflating the stock price to derive personal gain.78  Specifically, the
defendants contend that the plaintiffs touted "iNSpire's software
products and contracts despite the software's critical flaws," issued
70. Id.
71. Teamsters Local 445, 531 F.3d at 195.
72. Id. at 197.
73. Id. at 196.
74. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513, F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008).
75. Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2008).
76. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004).
77. Id. at 359.
78. Id. at 360.
[VOL. 84
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inaccurate earning statements, violated Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, 79 and improperly capitalized software development costs.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to have the case dismissed,
finding that the plaintiffs failed to plead the fraud with particularity as
required by PSLRA and improperly relied on the group pleadings
doctrine.8 1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the allegations against the
individual defendants to determine if the plaintiffs had enough
particularized facts to raise a strong inference of scienter. The court
began by addressing the plaintiffs' use of the group pleading doctrine.
82
The group pleading doctrine is a legal concept that allows plaintiffs to
rely on a presumption that statements made in company issued
documents are the collective work of the individuals directly involved
in the management on the company. 84 The Fifth Circuit found that it
had never adopted the group pleading doctrine prior to the enactment of
the PSLRA and, since the PSLRA, the group pleading doctrine has
effectively been abolished by the particularity requirement. 85  This is
significant for the analysis of collective corporate scienter because the
court reaffirms the requirement that plaintiffs in a securities fraud suit
must "distinguish among those they sue and enlighten each defendant as
to his or her particular part in the alleged fraud."
Next, the court addressed the claims against the corporate defendant,
finding that:
For the purposes of determining whether a statement
made by the corporation was made by it with the
requisite Rule 10(b) scienter we believe it appropriate to
look to the state of mind of the individual corporate
official or officials who make or issue the statement...
rather than generally to the collective knowledge of all
79. "The phrase 'generally accepted accounting principles' is a technical accounting term that
encompasses the conventions, rules, and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practice at
a particular time. It includes not only broad guidelines of general application, but also detailed practices
and procedures. Those conventions, rules, and procedures provide a standard by which to measure
financial presentations." AUDITING STANDARDS BD., AM. INSTIT. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
THE MEANING OF PRESENT FAIRLY IN CONFORMITY WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES (1992), http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AU41 l_02.aspx.
80. Southland, 365 F.3d at 360.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 363-64.
83. Such as annual reports and press releases.
84. Southland, 365 F.3d at 363-64.
85. Id. at 364.
86. Id. at 365 (quoting Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc., No. 3:97-CV-3158-L, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3240, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2002)).
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the corporation's officers and employees. 87
In support of this position, the court cited to an opinion issued by the
Ninth Circuit in Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., stating that
"there is no case law supporting an independent 'collective scienter'
theory.' 88 The Fifth Circuit also referenced a district court opinion from
within the Ninth Circuit which found that "[a] defendant corporation is
deemed to have the requisite scienter for fraud only if the individual
corporate officer making the statement has the requisite level of
scienter. ' '89  Therefore, the court concluded that to determine if the
corporate defendant acted with the requisite scienter, it must first
determine if the allegations "adequately show such a state of mind on
the part of the individual defendants." 9° The Fifth Circuit held that a
finding of scienter on the part of the corporate defendant is only possible
if the individuals named in the complaint are also found to have acted
with the requisite scienter.91  The court concluded with a detailed
analysis of each fraudulent act alleged by the plaintiff and found that
only one of the complaints against the individual defendants was
properly pleaded.92
Although addressing a different issue, the Eleventh Circuit
commented similarly on the proper interpretation of the PSLRA in
Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.93  The Eleventh Circuit exercised
discretion to address the issue of scienter because it closely related to the
certified question in the case. 94 The court held that "scienter must be
found with respect to each defendant and with respect to each alleged
violation of the statute. ' 95 This language signifies the Eleventh Circuit's
unwillingness to collectively gather violations and apply them to all
defendants; rather, the court requires that the plaintiff show facts that
each defendant had the proper scienter.
96
87. Id. at 366.
88. Id. (quoting Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995)).
89. Southland, 365 F.3d at 366. (quoting In re Apple Computer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d
1012, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
90. Id. at 367.
91. Id. at 384-85.
92. Id. at 385. Because the plaintiffs properly pleaded a claim against an individual defendant, it
is possible that the corporate defendant could also be found to have acted with the proper scienter to
have violated Rule 10b. However, if none of the plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants
were proper, then the Fifth Circuit would say that the corporate defendant could not have possibly acted
with the proper scienter.
93. 374 F.3d 1015 (llth Cir. 2004).
94. Id. at 1017.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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C. The Sixth Circuit
1. Initial Ruling
The Sixth Circuit first addressed the PSLRA standard for pleading a
complaint in City of Monroe Emples. Ret. Sys., v. Bridgestone Corp.
9 7
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, Bridgestone Corp., Firestone
Inc., and Bridgestone's CEO, had violated federal securities law by
misrepresenting the financial status of the company in the annual
reports.98  Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the corporate
defendants neglected to fully reveal the true status of a certain brand of
tires that, given the high rate of accidents, they should have known were
faulty.99 The defendants were aware of the faults as early as 1993, but
there were no efforts to investigate or correct the problem until
Bridgestone and Bridgestone's subsidiary, Firestone, launched a
voluntary recall in 2000 after hundreds of deaths and thousands of
injuries resulted from the faulty tires. 100
The plaintiffs alleged that the CEO of Bridgestone had actual
knowledge of the misleading statements being produced in the annual
reports.'1 The Sixth Circuit held that the knowledge that these
statements were false or misleading could be imputed onto the corporate
defendants despite the fact that the complaint failed to link the statement
to the CEO who was the only individual defendant named in the
complaint. 1 This case was the first to show that corporate defendants
could be found to have acted with scienter without finding that any
named individual defendants also acted with scienter.
2. The New Rule
The Sixth Circuit was given an opportunity to reevaluate its stance on
collective corporate scienter in In Re Omnicare, Inc. Securities
Litigation.1 °3 The case reached the Sixth Circuit on appeal from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
104
Plaintiffs, including a proposed class of persons that purchased
Omnicare's common stock between January 2007 and August 2010,
97. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys., v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005).
98. Id. at 661.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 662
101. Id. at 688-89.
102. City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 688-89.
103. In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2014).
104. In re Omnicare, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 11-cv-173-DLB-CJS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42973
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 27, 2013).
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brought a putative securities class action suit against Omnicare, Inc.,
alleging that the defendants made materially false statements. The
group of named defendants included: (1) the corporate defendant
Omnicare, Inc.; (2) Omnicare president and CEO, Joel Germunder; (3)
Omnicare CFO, David Froesel; and (4) another senior vice president.
Most of the plaintiffs' allegations stemmed from allegations claimed
in a qui tam action 10 5 filed in the Northern District of Illinois by John
Stone, Omnicare's former Vice President of Internal Audits.10  Mr.
Stone performed three audits of Omnicare and said that he discovered
widespread problems in the company's submission of Medicare and
Medicaid claims. Of the eighteen pharmacies included in the audit, Mr.
Stone claimed that all eighteen had "submitted numerous claims during
the time period [between 2000 and 2005] . . . without having the
required supply documentation retained on file."'0 7 According to Mr.
Stone, "the error rates were so high that Omnicare knew or should have
known that these 'false' claims were being made." 10 8 However, the trial
court dismissed all of Mr. Stone's original claims.109
The plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint alleging five
separate violations of rule lOb-5. 110  As a result of these fraudulent
behaviors, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were able to
artificially inflate the stock price of the company. 11' The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended consolidated
complaint.112
The district court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that any of
the named individual defendants were made aware of the results of Mr.
Stone's audits, and even if the CEO had been made aware, the complaint
did not allege "sufficient facts to support a conclusion that from [that]
knowledge they knew their legal compliance statements were false."
105. In a qui tam action, a private party called a relator brings an action on the government's
behalf. The government, not the relator, is considered the real plaintiff. If the government succeeds, the
relator receives a share of the award. Qui tam action, LEGAL INFO. INSTIT.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/qui tam action (last visited April 22, 2015).
106. Omnicare, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42973, at *7.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *10.
110. Id. at **11-12. The plaintiffs claimed that: (1) Omnicare falsely represented in its SEC
filings that it was in compliance with state and federal regulations; (2) Omnicare falsely represented that
its issues with Medicare and Medicaid compliance had been resolved; (3) Omnicare issued false
financial reports during the class period on filings with the SEC and falsely reported artificially inflated
financial data in its quarterly earnings conference call; (4) Omnicare made material misrepresentations
and/or omissions by attributing its success to legitimate business factors; and (5) the named individual
defendants knowingly signed false Sarbanes-Oxley certification. Id.
111. Omnicare, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42973, at *12.
112. Id. at *13.
113. Id. at**33-34.
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Because none of the individual defendants, based on the complaint filed,
had actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements, the court then
considered if an individual who was not a defendant could have his or
her knowledge imputed on the corporation.ll4 The court noted that the
plaintiffs failed "to cite primary authority where the knowledge of a
non-defendant employee, who did not make the compliance statement,
was imputed to the company for the purposes of finding that a
corporation had actual knowledge." 115 The court went on to say that
even if it was inclined to attach liability to the corporate defendant based
on the knowledge of non-defendant employees, the plaintiffs did not
allege sufficient facts to support a finding that Omnicare was aware that
its compliance statements were false. 116
Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit where it was
accepted in an attempt to clarify its own previous holding on the
topic. 117 The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of scienter by recognizing
that the existing law was split among the circuit courts. n 8 The court
found that, on one extreme, the Fifth Circuit kept strictly to common-
law fraud principles by allowing scienter to be imputed to a corporation
only under respondeat superior.1 19 On the other extreme was the Sixth
Circuit's previous ruling in City of Monroe, in which the Court took a
stance that "could expose corporations to liability far beyond what
Congress had authorized." 120  Since then, the Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have weighed in without fully embracing either extreme,
but all recognize that it is "possible to draw a strong inference of
corporate scienter without being able to name the individuals"
responsible for the fraud. 121
The Sixth Circuit recognized that "neither [the Fifth Circuit's nor the
Sixth Circuit's original view]-when taken to the extreme-is ideal." 122
Therefore, without overturning its opinion in City of Monroe, the Sixth
Circuit crafted a middle ground. The new rule is as follows:
The state(s) of mind of any of the following are
probative for the purposes of determining whether a
misrepresentation made by a corporation was made by it
with the requisite scienter under Section 10b:
114. Id. at **35-36.
115. Id. at *35.
116. Omnicare, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42973, at *36.
117. In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2014).
118. Id. at 473-75.
119. Id. at473-74.
120. Id. at 475.
121. Id. at 474.
122. Omnicare, 769 F.3d at 475.
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a. The individual agent who uttered or issued the
misrepresentation;
b. Any individual agent who authorized, requested,
commanded, furnished information for, prepared
(including suggesting or contributing language for
inclusion therein, or omission therefrom), reviewed,
or approved the statement in which the
misrepresentation was made before its utterance or
issuance;
c. Any highly managerial agent or member of the board
of directors who ratified, recklessly disregarded or
tolerated the misrepresentation after its utterance.
123
The Court found that this new rule was consistent with its prior
holding but clarified some of the opinion's "overly broad" language.
124
Additionally, the court noted that this rule "prevents corporations from
evading liability through tacit encouragement and willful ignorance"
while also protecting corporations from the liability of the strike suit.
12 5
The Sixth Circuit found that none of the named defendants satisfied the
new "middle ground" test; therefore, the plaintiff had failed to plead
scienter with respect to any named individual defendants.
126
While the district court found no evidence that non-defendant
employees could have their scienter imputed on the company if they did
not make the statements in question, the Sixth Circuit never explicitly
addressed the issue.127  However, despite the fact that no individual
defendants had scienter, the Sixth Circuit still performed an analysis to
see if the corporate defendant acted with scienter, suggesting that the
court thought it possible. 128 However, the court held that the plaintiffs
in this case failed to sufficiently plead facts that would give rise to a
strong inference that the company acted with scienter. 129 Accordingly,
the circuit court upheld the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claim. 130
123. Id. at 476.
124. Id.
125. Id. at477.
126. Id. at 483. The court determined that Mr. Stone was both an individual who allegedly
furnished information for and reviewed the statements in which the misrepresentations were made and a
high managerial agent who ratified or tolerated the misrepresentation. Id.
127. See generally Omnicare, 769 F.3d 455.
128. See id. at 483-84.
129. Id.
130. Id. at484.
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IV. THE "MIDDLE GROUND" RULE IS APPROPRIATE BUT COLLECTIVE
SCIENTER Is NOT APPROPRIATE
The problem with the existing case law's approach to attaching
corporate scienter can be broken down into two components: (1)
identification and (2) collection. The identification component seeks to
answer whether proving corporate scienter requires that the plaintiff be
able to point to an individual within the corporation as the cause of the
fraud or the misstatement. Identification is the key factor in determining
the best method for attaching corporate scienter because it focuses on
which employees can have their knowledge imputed. The second
component, collection, is concerned with whether knowledge-
specifically, the knowledge of individuals within the corporation who
lack scienter-can be added together to create enough collective group
knowledge to find scienter on behalf of the corporate defendant.
Collection is the key factor for the analysis of the collective scienter
doctrine. Both components critically affect the way corporate scienter is
implemented, and the interpretation of each component will have lasting
impacts on securities litigation.
This Part will seek to accomplish two things: (1) briefly review the
Sixth Circuit's proposed rule and determine from the existing case law
that the Sixth Circuit's new "middle ground" rule is the most effective
way to attach scienter to corporate defendants; and (2) focus on how
courts should apply the "middle ground" rule and offer an answer to the
question of whether a plaintiff can use the doctrine of collective scienter
to successfully plead corporate scienter if the plaintiff cannot
successfully plead scienter on the part of any individual defendant. In
comparing the Sixth Circuit's opinion to the Second Circuit's opinion in
Teamsters, this analysis will determine that the doctrine of collective
scienter is inappropriate under the SEA and PSLRA, and that the"middle ground" rule should be read to reject a theory of collective
scienter. Any amount of collective scienter runs contrary to the plain
language of the PSLRA and works to dilute the effects of the heightened
pleading standard.
A. The Most Effective Method for Attaching Corporate Scienter
The Sixth Circuit opinion in In re Omnicare laid out a solution to the
existing circuit split regarding how corporate scienter should be applied
in securities fraud litigations. 131 The "middle ground" rule proposed
that the knowledge of any employee is "probative" of corporate scienter
131. See generally id.
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if he or she "commanded, furnished information for, [or] prepared" the
information that lead to the misleading or fraudulent statement. 132 With
regard to the identification component, the language of the "middle
ground" rule splits the difference between the existing rules of law. The
Sixth Circuit expands on the Fifth Circuit's rule, which allowed only the
speaker's scienter to be imputed, by identifying three categories of,. 133
employees that can have scienter imputed to the corporation.
However, the Sixth Circuit's rule also narrowed the scope of the Second
Circuit's rule by prohibiting all employees from being considered for
corporate scienter.
The Sixth Circuit's method of applying corporate scienter is
amazingly simple. The court expanded the total number of individuals
that could have their scienter imputed on the corporation13 4 but required
that the plaintiff affirmatively identify any individual that fits at least
one of three groups of employees who had a significant impact on the
fraudulent statement. 13 5  The Sixth Circuit's "middle ground" test
succeeds in finding a compromise between the other circuit courts while
also satisfying the requirements of the PSLRA. 136  The Sixth Circuit
appropriately declares that only individuals the plaintiff can identify,
and show to fit within one of the three categories, can have their
knowledge imputed on the corporation. The test is the appropriate
method for attaching scienter to corporate defendants in securities fraud
cases under Section 1Ob and Rule 1Ob-5.
B. Any Collective Scienter Is Too Much Collective Scienter
1. The Sixth Circuit and the Collection Component
In sharp contrast with its clarity on the concept of identification, the
Sixth Circuit's intentions are much less clear with regard to the
collection component, because the court never explicitly addresses the
132. Omnicare, 769 F.3d at 476.
133. Id. The categories are: (1) the speaker of a misrepresentation; (2) anyone involved in the
composition or delivery of the misrepresentation; and (3) high-ranking agents or board members who
recklessly disregarded or tolerated the misstatements.
134. As compared to the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits who have said that only the speaker of the
fraudulent statement can have their knowledge imputed on the corporation. See Southland Sec. Corp. v.
INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004).
135. This ensures that those employees who have their knowledge imputed to the corporation
actually were involved in the making of the statement.
136. Congress was clear when it enacted the PSLRA; the goal was to prevent fraudulent securities
fraud litigation by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to plead a violation of Section 10b and Rule
lOb-5. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
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question of collective scienter. 137  The "middle ground" rule says that
the state of mind of the individuals is "probative" of the state of mind of
the corporation. 138 Based on this language, the court might imply that
the knowledge of any one identified individual is not conclusive of the
knowledge of the corporation and should be considered with other
individuals' knowledge. 139 This interpretation is possibly supported by
the Sixth Circuit's application of the "middle ground" rule in In re
Omnicare. Despite the fact that the Sixth Circuit found that none of the
identified individual defendants acted with scienter, the court still
engaged in an analysis to determine if the corporation acted with
scienter. 14  This type of analysis would not be necessary unless the
court felt that corporate scienter could exist independent from individual
scienter. Therefore, if the court believed that corporate scienter could
have existed without independent individual scienter, the court was
likely looking to see if the individual defendants could collectively have
the requisite scienter imputed upon the corporation. 14 1 If this is correct,
the Sixth Circuit embraced the concept of collective scienter that is
supported, to varying degrees, by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits.
However, in the rule's brief history, district courts within the Sixth
Circuit have not applied the rule in this same fashion. 142 Instead, district
courts have used the rule to examine appropriate scienter of individuals
within the corporation. If the court concludes that individual scienter
has not been alleged sufficiently, the individual cannot have his or her
scienter imputed to the corporation; each identified individual defendant
is reviewed independently of all others. 143  The district courts'
interpretation assumes that the Sixth Circuit did not intend to allow the
knowledge of multiple employees to be combined to support a finding
137. See generally In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2014).
138. Id. at 476.
139. It can be argued that if the Sixth Circuit wanted an employee's knowledge to be considered
independent of all other employees' knowledge then it would use stronger language, such as describing
the state of mind as "indicative" or "determinative" rather than "probative."
140. See Omnicare, 769 F.3d at 483-84.
141. The easiest way to understand collective scienter is with an example. Imagine a group of
three people that want to enter a party that costs $10 per group, but none of the individuals have a ten
dollar bill. Person A has 4 dollars, and Person B and Person C each have $3 dollars. Independent of
one another, none of the individuals could have gotten into the party; however, the individuals can be
viewed collectively as having the required $10 to enter the party. Collective scienter operate in much
the same way except instead of money, the courts will look at the knowledge of the individual
defendants.
142. See Doshi v. Gen. Cable Corp., No. 2:14-cv-22, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9306 (E.D. Ky. Jan.
27, 2015); see also In re Yum! Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., 73 F. Supp. 3d 846 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
143. See generally In re Yum! Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., 73 F. Supp. 3d 846. See also generally
Doshi, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9306.
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of corporate scienter. If this is correct, then the Sixth Circuit's "middle
ground" rule sided fully with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits by
eliminating collective scienter and requiring any individual to
independently have scienter before his or her knowledge can be imputed
to the corporate defendant.
While it is possible that the Sixth Circuit intended to embrace the
theory of collective scienter, the district courts that have interpreted the
Sixth Circuit's rule in In re Omnicare have correctly found that the
Sixth Circuit's "middle ground" rule does not permit corporate scienter
without individual scienter. 144
2. There Cannot Be Corporate Scienter Without Individual Scienter
Corporate scienter cannot be pleaded without identifying an
individual defendant that meets the scienter requirement. Under the"middle ground" rule, a plaintiff who has failed to identify anyone with
individual scienter under Section 10b and Rule 1 Ob-5 has failed to plead
scienter on behalf of the corporate defendant. A finding to the contrary,
as the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits deem appropriate, cannot
and should not be supported because it: (1) would be contrary to the
congressional intent for passing the heightened pleading standard of the
PSLRA; (2) would be more akin to a negligence standard which is
inappropriate under existing law; (3) would have a chilling effect on
corporate disclosures; and (4) would create inconsistent federal law that
would have negative policy implications.
i. Contrary to Congressional Intent
The congressional intent behind Section 10b of the SEA and Rule
1Ob-5 was to create an open and transparent system of corporate
disclosure and, wherever possible, prevent corporate officers from
defrauding shareholders. 145 As previously discussed, the PSLRA was
intended to prevent the abuse of Section 1 Ob and Rule 1 Ob-5 by making
it more difficult for plaintiffs to plead a violation of either provision.
If the Sixth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's approach to collective
scienter, it would allow a finding of corporate scienter without ever
identifying an individual who acted with the scienter. In this situation,
the test would undermine the very standard that it intends to support.
There is no support for the proposition that a named individual
144. For the sake of this Article, the author assumes that the district court interpretations are
accurate and that the Sixth Circuit "middle ground" rule rejects collective scienter.
145. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
146. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
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defendant can be found to have knowledge of fraud or a misstatement
simply because of the defendant's title or position in the corporate
hierarchy. 147 However, the Second Circuit takes it one step farther by
allowing the plaintiff to impute scienter to the corporation by alleging
that an unnamed individual defendant "must have known enough to
know" that the statement was fraudulent. 148 This argument rests on
little more than supposition and "encourages plaintiffs to bring cases
attempting to rely on the rule by asserting only general allegations of
scienter.' ' r 49 This would allow plaintiffs to rely on the very same type of
vague accusations that Congress found insufficient when passing the150
PSLRA. The Second Circuit's approach essentially eliminates the
"particularity" requirement of the PSLRA, because it is impossible to
plead facts that give rise to a strong inference of scienter if the plaintiffs
fail to identify an individual who had the fraudulent state of mind.
Congress intended to protect corporations from strike suits by making
it more difficult for plaintiffs to plead Rule 1Ob-5 violations. The
particularity of the PSLRA is a key component for accomplishing the
goals of Congress. Without the particularity requirement, the plaintiff
can plead general facts regarding the mindset of the defendants, which is
no different than the original pleading requirement under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 51 Treating the PSLRA this way ignores its
purpose and runs contrary to the congressional intent.
ii. The PSLRA Requires More Than a Negligence Standard
Another serious concern with the Second Circuit's application of the
collective scienter theory is that it alters the standard of care required by
the defendant corporation. Under existing law, every circuit court has
found that knowledge or recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the pleading
requirement under Section 10b or Rule 1Ob-5.152 However, if the
Second Circuit's rule is accepted and plaintiffs can use the collective
knowledge of a group of unidentified individuals, then the plaintiff only
has to show negligence under Rule lOb-5 complaints. This would be
inappropriate because the Supreme Court has previously stated that it is"quite unwilling to extend the scope of [Section 10b] to negligent
147. Erica E Bonnett, Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc.,
54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 395,400 (2010).
148. Id. at 400-01.
149. Id. at 402
150. Id.
151. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
152. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425'U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
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conduct." 153
The standard advanced by the Second Circuit would be one of res
ipsa loquitur where the plaintiff only needs to show that the fraud
occurred and that someone within the corporation must have known it
was fraudulent or was reckless in not knowing. One of the most
frequently articulated examples of the appropriate use of collective
scienter comes from the Seventh Circuit. In the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Makor, the court says that it is possible to find corporate
scienter without finding individual scienter in situations that are
especially "dramatic," such as a sales announcement that reported one
million units when the actual number was zero. 154 This example plainly
represents a scenario that resembles the concept of res ipsa loquitur
where the plaintiff can merely plead circumstantial evidence that some
employee must have been at fault and, therefore, the corporation is at
fault. However, there is nothing that suggests that Congress
anticipated this to be the standard required under the SEA, and the
Supreme Court has plainly dismissed this approach. Using a standard
that falls short of a reckless standard to show a violation of Section 10b
or Rule 1Ob-5 would clearly violate the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the SEA and Rule lOb-5.
iii. Creates a Chilling Effect
The doctrine of collective scienter creates a chilling effect that
adversely affects the entire securities industry. While some national
exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange, have disclosure
requirements for their publicly traded companies, courts have held
that "there is no general duty on the part of a company to provide the
public with all material information."15 7  To heighten the pleading
standard and insulate the corporations, the PSLRA was enacted which
encouraged corporations to disclose information to shareholders without
the fear of repercussions if any unintentional misstatements were found
in the disclosures.
Collective scienter would remove this insulation and once again
expose corporations to frivolous lawsuits. Plaintiffs could plead
generally that the collective knowledge of the employees on the
153. Id. at 214.
154. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cit. 2007).
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, § 17.
156. See Listed Company Manual, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, § 202.05 (2009),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp 1 3_2_6&manual=% 2
Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F.
157. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1432 (3rd Cir. 1997).
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unintentional inaccuracy of a voluntary disclosure was great enough to
plead scienter on the part of the corporation . If corporations want to
avoid liability in a jurisdiction that permits collective scienter, the"corporations would be required to speak to each and every employee
and former employee ...to ensure that no one possesses knowledge
that, when coupled with an unknowing misstatement, would give rise to• • , ,,158
collective scienter. This type of policing within the business is
inefficient for corporations, because it claims resources that should be
dedicated to creating shareholder wealth and uses them to prevent
frivolous securities lawsuits.
The SEA also requires that corporations make some annual filings
and disclosures, 159 which makes collective scienter even more costly to
the corporation. For these required disclosures, the corporation needs to
control the employees whose knowledge will become the basis of the
disclosures. Controlling the employees that have the knowledge is the
only way to limit the corporate liability with respect to required
disclosures. "If a corporation can be charged with securities fraud based
on the knowledge of any of its employrees or agents" then the
corporation has to control every employee. Identifying an employee
that has knowledge about the disclosure can be extremely costly for a
corporation, and the problem is only exacerbated for very large
corporations with numerous employees.1 6'
Accepting the theory of collective scienter would incentivize
corporations to limit the frequency of their disclosures, which would run
contrary to the PSLRA's purpose of encouraging corporate disclosures
and would also create inefficiencies in the securities market. These
inefficiencies will ultimately cost the shareholders, because the
corporations will focus more resources on avoiding liability as opposed
to creating shareholder wealth. This effect runs contrary to the SEA's
purpose of protecting shareholders' interests.
iv. Inconsistent Federal Securities Law
While scarcely discussed, one of the most significant drawbacks of
accepting the collective scienter theory is that the theory will create
inconsistent federal law. Even assuming that the Supreme Court accepts
collective scienter, the entire application of the theory is subject to the
whim of the court hearing the claim. By allowing a plaintiff to argue
that the collective knowledge of the corporation meets the scienter
158. Bondi, supra note 39, at 23.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
160. Bondi, supra note 39, at 25.
161. See id. at 25.
2016]
23
Jennewine: What's Mine Is Yours: The Circuit Split Over Collective Corporate
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
requirement without requiring the plaintiff to show which individuals
acted with scienter is equivalent to saying that the misstatement is
dramatic enough that someone in the corporation must have known
about it. The-problem here lies in the fact that the determination of
when a misstatement is considered dramatic enough differs from person
to person.
The Seventh Circuit's example of a sales report that predicts $1
million in sales while sales are actually $0, is cited by the Second and
Ninth Circuits as an example of a situation where corporate scienter
without individual scienter would be appropriate. 162 However, none of
the circuit courts that reference this example even attempt to explain
why this situation is sufficient.
The average securities litigation settlement in 2013 was
approximately $71.3 million, almost $20 million greater than the
inflation adjusted average for settlements between 1996 and 2012.163
With the size of settlements growing, the importance of developing a
consistent and equitable method of determining corporate liability in
shareholder security litigation suits is critical. Allowing the
determination of whether a corporation has met the PSLRA's scienter
requirement based on the subjective perception of the judge yields
inconsistencies and blurs the line between acceptable and unacceptable
action. By blurring this line, courts make it more difficult for a
corporation to self-regulate effectively. The court's method for
determining when collective scienter should be used is nothing more
than a shot in the dark, which is inefficient for all parties involved.
Allowing a plaintiff to use the collective scienter theory to plead
scienter on behalf of a corporate defendant is inconsistent and will
create unpredictable results in securities litigation throughout the federal
courts. With potentially hundreds of millions of dollars on the line, the
importance of consistency in the determination of corporate liability
cannot be understated. The collective scienter theory threatens the
stability that is so vital to the securities industry.
C The Future of the Law
The Sixth Circuit opinion could have a tremendous impact on existing
securities law. The holding offers a reasonable middle ground for
162. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008); see also
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195-96 (2d Cir.
2008); Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2008).
163. Securities Class Action Settlements, CORNERSTONE RES.,
https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/el800abc-dc50-4df3-b7a9-cf~ee3feal 16/Securities-Class-
Action-Settlements-2013-Review-and-Analysis.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
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determining which employees can have scienter imputed to the
corporation and also requires that at least one individual defendant have
scienter before attributing scienter to the corporation. The impact of this
decision will be felt by corporations, particularly large corporations with
numerous employees, who no longer have to worry that some unnamed,
lower level employee will have his or her individual scienter imputed on
the corporation. The Sixth Circuit's interpretation will protect
corporations that are senselessly included in litigation from having to
decide between expensive litigation to protect their name or an
expensive settlement to avoid negative publicity.
1. The Supreme Court
Federal securities law has evolved into one of the most complex areas
of law. Unlike other circuit opinions, the holding in In re Omnicare
provides clear-cut categories into which employees must fit before their
individual scienter can be imputed to the corporation. This new "middle
ground" will offer significant consistencies between the district courts
within the Sixth Circuit. While not currently before the Supreme Court,
the issue of corporate scienter is ripe for the Supreme Court to decide.
The Supreme Court should accept either In re Omnicare, or another
securities fraud case dealing with corporate scienter, and confirm that
the Sixth Circuit's "middle ground" approach is the most effective
method of attaching corporate scienter.
Furthermore, the Court should also eliminate the concept of collective
corporate scienter from securities law because it violates the core tenants
of the PSLRA. Allowing plaintiffs to plead scienter on behalf of the
corporation, without pleading scienter on behalf of any individual within
the corporation, gives plaintiffs an opportunity to side-step the
heightened pleading standard-a standard implemented to make
pleading a securities fraud violation more difficult. Elimination of
collective scienter will also create a more consistent set of federal
securities laws by shifting the process for determining sufficient
evidence to support corporate scienter from subjective judicial
determination to an objective application of a judicially-created test.
2. The Legislature
The Commission promulgated the PSLRA in an attempt to prevent
strike suits by raising the bar plaintiffs have to overcome when pleading
securities fraud suits.1 64 The Second Circuit's approach of allowing
164. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
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collective scienter is contrary to the PSLRA's intent of preventing
frivolous suits against corporations. The Second Circuit imputes
scienter from the collective knowledge of a pool of employees and
allows a plaintiff to impute scienter to a corporation by merely pleading
general allegations that create a possibility of corporate wrongdoing. 165
By ignoring the standards that the PSLRA puts in place, the Second
Circuit inappropriately alters the substantive law.
Congress does not need to wait for the Supreme Court to interpret this
issue. The Legislature can pass an amendment to the SEA expressly
prohibiting the knowledge of employees from being collected to find
scienter. Such an amendment would specify that corporations can only
act with scienter if the plaintiff can plead scienter with respect to a
named employee of the corporation. While this method of resolution
would definitively clarify any ambiguity in this area, the process would
also likely become more complex and require additional time.
Regardless of how the statutory language would be structured, Congress
would want to make it clear that a corporation can only have scienter
pled against it if there is at least one employee of the corporation that
also has scienter successfully pled against it.
V. CONCLUSION
In response to increased "strike suits," the Securities Exchange
Commission passed the PSLRA. 166 The act raised the pleading standard
for plaintiffs claiming a Rule 1Ob-5 securities fraud violation. 167
Securities lawsuits that followed resulted in a circuit split over two
aspects of the PSLRA. The first question of law was regarding which
employees could have their scienter imputed to a corporate defendant.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits held that only the speaker of the
misstatement could have his or her scienter imputed to the
corporation. 168 The Sixth Circuit, followed by the Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits, held that any employee could have scienter imputed to
the corporation. 169 In an attempt to resolve the split, the Sixth Circuit
revisited the issue in In re Omnicare.170 The Sixth Circuit created three
165. See Bonnett, supra note 147, at 400.
166. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
168. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004);
Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
169. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005);
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2nd Cir. 2008);
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008); Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v.
Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008).
170. In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2014).
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categories and held that before an employee can have scienter imputed
to the corporation, the plaintiff had to show that the individual fit within
one of the three categories. 171
The second issue dividing the courts was the theory of collective
scienter. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits denied the theory of collective
scienter, holding that each individual must be considered independently
from all other individuals. 172  However, the Sixth Circuit, and the
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, to a lesser degree, held that two or
more employees, who did not meet the scienter requirement
individually, could have their combined knowledge imputed to the
corporation in an attempt to plead corporate scienter. 1  The Sixth
Circuit's "middle ground" rule in Omnicare does not explicitly address
the issue;1 74 however, district court opinions interpreting the Sixth
Circuit's holding have not applied the theory of collective scienter. 175
The Sixth Circuit's "middle ground" rule is the most efficient method
for attaching corporate scienter, while also accomplishing the goals of
both the SEA and the PSLRA. Additionally, the "middle ground" rule
does not apply collective scienter. By leaving collective scienter out of
the equation, the Sixth Circuit prevents a chilling effect on corporate
disclosures, reduces inconsistencies in federal securities law, and
provides an interpretation that is consistent with the language of the
PSLRA and the congressional intent.
Moving forward, courts should follow the example set by the Sixth
Circuit by adopting the "middle ground" rule. Additionally, courts
should abandon the theory of collective scienter, because it is
inconsistent with the policies enacted by the Commission and Congress.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in In re Omnicare offers a major step
forward for securities fraud litigation and protects corporations from
strike suits that cost corporations millions of dollars each year. The
Supreme Court or the Legislature will need to resolve the dispute once
and for all, but in the meantime, the Sixth Circuit has provided the
appropriate framework for all other courts to follow.
171. See id. at 476.
172. See Southland, 365 F.3d 353; see also Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015
(1 th Cir. 2004).
173. See City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005); see
also Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir.
2008); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008); Glazer Capital Mgmt.,
LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008).
174. See generally Omnicare, 769 F.3d 455.
175. See Doshi v. Gen. Cable Corp., No. 2:14-cv-22 (WOB-CJS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9306
(E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2015); see also In re Yum! Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., 73 F. Supp. 3d 846(W.D. Ky.
2014).
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